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CONTRACTS FOR THE BENEFIT
OF THIRD PARTIES
In Landers Inv. Co. v. Browqn S, being the owner in fee of land,
demised the same to defendant's assignor for a period of ninety-nine
years. The lease contained a covenant binding the tenant, his executors
and assigns, to pay annual rent in quarterly instalments as follows:
to S for her life, then to S's daughter should she survive S, and upon
the death of S and her daughter to such persons as would then have
been S's heirs had her daughter predeceased her. After both S and her
daughter had died, this contract came before the Supreme Court for
construction.
In the course of its opinion the court said, probably by way of
dictum, that the covenant to pay rent was binding, and that S, in effect,
had purchased "an annuity for the term of ninety-nine years:" 2 It was
stated that upon S's conveyance "the lessee ..... became bound to
make the quarter annual payments according to the covenant ..."
This portion of the opinion is taken as an intimation at least that a
contract for the benefit of unascertained third persons" is valid and
binding, and such parties are privileged to sue thereon as if privy
thereto, even though there is no debtor-creditor relationship between
such beneficiaries and the promisee. Inasmuch as the distinction be-
tween contracts under seal and simple contracts seem to have been
abolished by statute4 the suggestion, if followed, will establish a rule
applicable to all contracts. The statement by the court is the last at this
1. "(1923) 254 S. W. 14.
2. 254S. W. 1. c. 15.
3. 254S. W. .c. 15.
3a. The fact that the beneficiaries could not be determined until the death ofS
and her daughter and were therefore unknown when the contract was made, should
make no difference if it be conceded that contracts for the benefit of a person other
than the promisee can be enforced. Granting that a promisor's obligation of this
kind may be binding, the beneficiary when ascertained is the party qualified to sue.
The case is not like an attempted gift of tangible property, where normally there must
be a delivery and hence a person in being who is capable of receiving. The sole
question in this case is the extent of a defendant's obligation. He has given his
promise to his promisee; now will the law enforce it at the instance of the beneficiary?
See accordwith the suggestion, JJhitehead v. Burgess (1897) 61 N. J. L 75,38 Ad. 802.
4. In the principal case the contract was probably under seal, but see. 2159
R.,S. Mo. 1919 abolishes the use of priyate seals, and provides further that "the
addition of a private seal to any such instrument shall not in any manner affect its
force, validity or character, or in any way change the construction thereof." This
enactment should place covenants upon the same basis as simple contracts, hence the
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writing dealing with this type of contract; it invites an examination of
the authorities, and a consideration of the present condition of this
branch of the law.
"In the history of simple contract it was necessary for the plaintiff
to show detriment suffered by him, to-wit: that he had been deceived by the
defendant's promise into giving something up. If he could not show this,
he was non-suited, because the action of assumpsit (simple contract)
came into the law as an action on the case in the nature of deceit, and
if a plaintiff had not been deceived to his injury, he could not avail
himself of that form of action." 5 According to strict common law princi-
ples, therefore, if A makes a contract with B to render a performance to
C, it would have to be held that, in the event of A's breaching his
agreement, C could not sue thereon. Obviously C is not B's assignee;
neither is there present in the transaction, so far as C is concerned, the
requisite element of consideration. C is not A's promisee and could not
for that reason show that he had suffered detriment on the strength of
A's promise. It is natural enough, therefore, to find most of the early
decisions in cases similar to that supposed denying a plaintiff, situated as
C, all rights under the contract, and some modern opinions to the same
effect. 6 Strict adherence to technical rules will require a plaintiff, in an
action sounding in contract, to show that he is the defendant's promisee,
assertion in the text that beneficiaries under a sealed contract are equally free to sue
thereon. See accord with the general proposition Bosley v. Bosley (1900) 85 Mo. App.
424.
But even were there no such statute, the question of the right of a beneficiary to
sue under a covenant and under a simple contract (aside from the matter of consider-
ation) should be the same. It is in each case a matter of the extent of the obligation
assumed. If a covenantor has clearly assumed a liability to a beneficiary, the latter
should be free to sue just as he is when suing under similar conditions on a simple
contract. "I see no good reason for keeping up this sort of a distinction between
contracts under seal and not under seal. If the covenant is made for the benefit of a
third person, why is he not a party to it so as to maintain an action in his own name?"
Rogers v. Gosnell (1873) 51 Mo. 466, 469. See also Fitzgerald v. Barker, (1877) 4
Mo. App. 105; Weinreich v. Weinreich (1885) 18 Mo. App. 364, 371; JeJerson v. As4ch
(1893) 53 Minn. 446, 55 N. W. 604. Contra, Robbins v. Ayres (1847) 10 Mo. 539
(dictum): compare Case v. Case (1911) 203 N. Y. 263, 96 N. E. 440.
5. Charles T. Terry, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 893, in h scholarly review of Williston on
Contracts; Ames, Lectures on Legal History, 129 et seq.; Williston, Contracts, sec.
99; Anon. (1504) Keilwey 77; Coggs v. Bernard (1703) 1 Salk. 26. Professor Ames
tells us (op. cit. 145) that the proper allegation in early actions was as follows:
"yet the said C. D. not regarding his said promise, but contriving and fraudulently
intending, craftily and subtly to deceive and defraud the plaintiff" etc.
6. Page v. Becker (1862) 31 Mo. 466; Manny v. Frasier's Idm'r (1858) 27 Mo.
419 (see also Thornton v. Smith (1840) 7 Mo. 86); Price o. Easton (1833) 4 B. & A. 433;
Tweddle v. Atkinson (1861) 1 Best & Smith 393; Marston v. Bigelow (1889) 150 Mass.
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and that he has surrendered a legal right, or promised so to do. If he
can not prove these facts he has afforded no detriment to support the
defendant's promise.
It is believed, however, that the whole course of the law of con-
sideration has been away from the early notion of deceit. We do not
today regard consideration as a fact going to prove something in the
nature of deceit practiced by a defendant upon the plaintiff; this con-
45; Linniemann v. Moross Estate (1893) 98 Mich. 178, 57 N. W. 103. It was early
'held that if the beneficiary was a son or daughter, niece or nephew of the promisee,
the action would lie, the nearness of relationship being said to cure the defect caused
by the absence of consideration; Dutton v. Poole (1677) 2 Lcvinz 211; Todd v. J.Veber
(1884) 95 N. Y. 181, accord. But see contra, Tweddle v. tkinson and Marston v.
Bigelow, supra. Obviously, if consideration moving from the beneficiary is essential
to the latter's right, the fact that he is related to the promisee is in no sense the
equivalent of such consideration. See Scheele v. Bank (1906) 120 Mo. App. 611, 97
S. W. 621; in that case the fact that plaintiff-beneficiary was the daughter of the
promisee was mentioned, but no especial stress was placed upon this fact; the decision
would have been the same, it is believed, had this not been the case.
It has been said that a beneficiary's right to sue is in equity alone; Bird v.
Larius (1856) 7 Ind. 615; Ross v. Milne (1841) 12 Leigh (Va.) 204. Is the theory of
these cases that there is a trust? It is hardly correct to say that the defendant is the
beneficiary's trustee as his obligation is purely executory; see infra note 18, an
text in coneection therewith. In Ross v. Milne, supra, it is said that it is the duty of
the promisee to lend his name to the beneficiary to the end that the latter may sue.
Such a theory seems to involve the supposition that the promisee exacts the promise
for the benefit of a beneficiary and holds, so to speak, the obligation for the benefit
of the beneficiary; it would then be the duty of the promisee to sue in the event of a
breach and recover the amount of the damages suffered by the beneficiary, and turn
the same over to the latter. Naturally if the promisee is a trustee to this extent, and
fails in the performance of the trust, the beneficiary as a cestui could proceed in
equity in the place of the defaulting trustee. Sed quaere? Conceding that the promisee
intends to vest a right in the beneficiary, does he intend to assume the burden of
seeing that the defendant's obligation is carried out? Does he not rather intend to give
a right to the beneficiary, which the latter may enforce in his own name, if the courts
will let him? If the courts are not so disposed, that is the beneficiary's own loss;
there is no justification then for imposing a burden on the promisee which he never
intended to assume and did not assume. If B exacts a promise from A to do something
for C, there is no basis for assuming that B intends to see that A performs that duty
to C, and that he undertakes a duty to this effect.
Sec. 1156 R. S. Mo. 1919 provides that a trustee of an express trust may sue in
his own name without joining a person for whose benefit the suit is prosecuted, and
states "a trustee of an express trust within the meaning of this section shall be con-
strued to include a person with whom or in whose name a contract is made for the
benefit of another." It is not believed that this statutory provision does other than
authorize a prdmisee to sue if he so desires. In other words the statute does not
impose the duty of a trustee upon the promisee, but merely permits him to sue if he
so desires. It goes without saying that the statute does not prevent a plaintiff-
beneficiary from suing in his own name. See cases cited infra note 13; see also
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ception, in the beginning, may have been essential to find a remedy for a
broken contract,7 but surely this ought not to be and is not the case now.
Rather, we think of consideration as something done, or promised to be
done at the request of the promisor in return for his promise.8 The
proposition normally is that a promise which is not bought and paid
for with the promisee's act, or promise, is not binding, because there is
no justice in requiring a promisor to carry out his undertaking when
nothing moves from his promisee in return, and as compensation. On
the other hand, if such compensation exists, the promise will be binding.
At the same time, the law has never concerned itself with the value
of that which is done or promised to be done in return for the promise.
"The value of most considerations as well as most promises (i. e. con-
sideration in bilateral contracts) is a thing which the law can not
measure; it is not merely a matter of fact, but a matter of opinion. If,
therefore, the promisee' thinks that the consideration is equal to the
(i. e. his) promise in value (i. e. if he is willing to give the promise for the
Rogers o. Gosnell (1873) 51 Mo. 466, and Ellis v. Harrison (1891) 104 Mo. 270, 16
S. W. 198, each holding that either the promisee or the beneficiary may suc. Compare
Belt v. McLaughlin (1849) 12 Mo. 433. Occasionally a breach of the agreement may
cause damage to the promisee as well as to the beneficiary. In such a case the promi-
see under the statute, supra, would have both individual and representative rights,
could both be enforced in the same action, or would two separate suits be essential?
The cases have not answered this question. In Robbins v. 4yers, supra note 4, it was
held that, as the agreement was under seal, the action would have to be brought by
the covenantee and could not be brought by the beneficiary; but see Rogers v.
Gosnell, supra, note 4, holding that the beneficiary under such a contract may sue
just as well as one under a simple contract.
7. See Ames, op. cit. 130 el seq.; Williston, op. cit. sec. 99 where the learned
author states, "The defendant is regarded as a tort-feasor because, after assuming
to act and inducing the plaintiff to change his position, he has negligently injured the
plaintiff or his property.**".
8. "Nothing is consideration that is not regarded as such by both parties. It is
the price voluntarily paid for a promisor's undertaking." Philpot u. Gruninger (1871)
14 Wall (U. S.) 570, L c. 577, quoted in Keener's Cas. Contracts (2nd cd.) 203. "But
nothing operated as a consideration which is not regarded or treated as an item of
exchange by the parties. It must be offered by one party and accepted by the other
as the 'conventional inducement' or reciprocal concession for what is promised.
The phrases 'at defendant's request', 'in exchange for the promise', 'in consideration
of', unmistakably point to the fact that the rules of consideration find their object,
their reasons for existence in the law primarily as a test whether the engagement
of the parties is put on the basis of a bargain, or whether it is gratuitous and so lacking
any ground of enforcement." Ballantine, Doctrine of Consideration, 11 Mich. L.
Rev. 423,424. See also Williston, op. cit. sec. 102.
9. The quotation is from Professor Langdell's Summary of Contract Law.
The author must mean a defendant-promisor in a bilateral contract, who receives
consideration in the form of a promise, and is, for that reason, described as a promisee.
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sake of getting the consideration) the consideration will be equal to the
promise in value for all the purposes of the contract."' 0 In other words,
if a promisee does something, or. promises to do something at the re-
quest of his promisor in return for the latter's promise, the promise is
binding regardless of whether or not the court is of the opinion that
value was received by the promisor for that which he promised to do. So,
if A agrees to pay B $10 in return for B's promise to saw a stranger's
wood, or if B will saw such wood, B has afforded consideration in the
first case when he gives the promise, and in the second case when he
saws the wood. B has bought and paid for A's promise in spite of the
fact that it might be exceedingly difficult for a person less charitably
inclined than A to discover any compensation moving from B for the
promise at all. In short, the law is willing, for the most part, to consider
any act which can be legally done, and any promise to do such an act, as
adequate compensation to the promisor, and valid consideration to
support his promise. The only usual limitation upon this rule is that
the act done or promised to be done must not be one which the promisee
is already bound to do for the promisor."
If the modern theory of consideration is that it is conpensation in
the form of either a promise, or an act for a promisor's agreement, it is
impossible to contend that a defendant in a contract for the benefit
of a third party has not received it, if the contract between him and his
promisee complies with the requisites of simple contract law. Under
these conditions there will be consideration, but it will move from the
promisee and not from the plaintiff-beneficiary. This, however, should
not render a defendant's promise unenforceable; the important ques-
tion is not whence came the consideration, but rather did the defendant
receive any consideration at all? If he did, he should not be heard to say
that his promise, which has been paid for, is not obligatory because his
pay came from a person'other than the party who is suing. Why should
not a promisee be free to acquire a contractual obligation for another?
If it be the intention of parties to effect this result, what propriety is
there is allowing a defendant to escape from his purposed duties upon
grounds in which serve no useful end? It is believed that there really is no
valid reason for so doing, and if it appears that it was intended by the
10. Langdell, Summary of the Law of Contract, sec. 55. See accord, Bainbidge
v. Firmstone (1838) 8 A. & E. 743; Brooks v. Haigh (1840) 10 A. & E. 323; Carlillo.
Carbolic etc. Co. L. R. (1893) 1 Q. B. 256.
11. See Williston, op. cit. sec. 130; Lingenfelder v. lVaintright (1890) 103 Mo.
578, 15 S. W. 844.
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contracting parties to give a beneficiary such a right, a suit on the
contract at his instance should be entertained."
While it seems to be true that no court is justified in denying a
plaintiff-beneficiary relief on the ground that consideration, necessary
to support a defendant's promise is lacking, it does not follow that such
a party should always be allowed an action for breach of contract in
every case where a defendant's promisee has furnished consideration.
Whether or not such an action should be sanctioned ought to depend
upon the purpose of the contract; upon whether or not a promisee
made the bargain with the end in view of vesting a right to sue for a
breach in the beneficiary. The extent of a contractor's obligation
should be as great and no greater than intended; therefore, unless a
defendant appears reasonably to have assumed liability to suit, at the
instance of the beneficiary, the latter should not be privileged to sue.
If he is afforded this right, contrary to the intention of the parties, the
defendant's contractual obligation is changed and his burden may be
unwarrantably increased. It is not enough to say that a defendant's
performance will benefit the plaintiff and therefore unless the latter is
allowed to sue he will be deprived of a right. This conclusion is a
non-sequitur unless the defendant assumed a duty to the beneficiary.
The performance of many a contract may benefit a person who is not a
party thereto; yet such performance is normally no concern of such
person, and never should be unless the promisor bargains that the former
should be given a right to sue upon the agreement.
The real problem then in this class of cases is one of construction; of
determining in any given case whether or not there was an express or
implied undertaking on the part of the defendant to respond in damages
to the beneficiary in the event of a breach. It is accordingly proposed to
examine the decisions on this basis, and to determine in what trans-
actions presented to the courts there was a real contractual obligation to
submit to suit by a beneficiary. In making this analysis of the cases,
it is believed that they will divide themselves naturally into two classes,
namely: first; those where a defendant agrees to discharge for his prom-
isee a duty owing by the latter to the beneficiary, and second, those
where a defendant undertakes to do an act for the beneficiary which
will not constitute a discharge of a duty running from the promisee to the
beneficiary and where the performance will not benefit the promisee.
These two types of cases will therefore be dealt with separately. The
discussion will be further restricted by excluding from consideration,
12. "The reasons for this view are that it is just and practical to permit the
person for whose benefit the contract is made to enforce it against one whose duty
it is to pay." Seaver v. Ransom (1918) 224 N. Y. 233, 237, 120 N. E. 639.
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contracts by building-contractors and their sureties to pay laborers and
materialmen who work upon and furnish materials for public buildings
in the course of construction.
Suppose that A in consideration of a horse delivered to him by B
promises to discharge B's debt to C, amounting to $500; or suppose that
in consideration of $500 given to him by B, A makes the same agree-
ment. In each case, in the event of A's failure to keep his promise, there
are many decisions holding that C may sue A for a breach of the con-
tract.13 Various reasons are given to support this rule; it is occasionally
13. Corl v. Riggs (1849) 12 Mo. 431; Belt v. McLaughlin (1849) 12 Mo. 433;
Meyer v. Lowell (1869) 44 Mo. 328; Flanagan v. Hutchinson (1871) 47 Mo. 237;
Rogers v. Gosnell (1873) 51 Mo. 466; (see same case (1875) 58 Mo. 589); Schuster v.
K. C. etc. Ry. (1875) 60 Mo. 290; Holt v. Dollarhide (1875) 61 Mo. 433; Cress v.
Blodgett (1877) 64 Mo. 449 (dictum); Fitzgerald v. Barker (1879) 70 Mo. 685; Wiggins
v. Chicago etc. Co. (1881) 73 Mo. 389; Snider v. 4dams etc. Co. (1883) 77 Mo. 523;
Ellis v. Harrison (1891) 104 Mo. 270, 16 S. W. 198; Salmon Falls Bank v. Leyser
(1893) 116 Mo. 51, 22 S. W. 504 (a suit in equity); Winn v. Lippincott Inc. (1894)
125 Mo. 528, 28 S. W. 998; State v. St. Louis etc. Co. (1894) 125 Mo. 596, 28 S. W.
1074 (dictum); Porter v. Woods (1897) 138 Mo. 539, 39 S. W. 794; Pratt v. Conway
(1899) 148 Mo. 291, 49 S. W. 1028; Fitzgerald v. Barker (1877) 4 Mo. App. 105
(see same case supra, 70 Mo. 685, and also (1884) 85 Mo. 14); Beardslee v. Morgntr
(1877) 4 Mo. App. 139; Luthy v. Woods (1878) 6 Mo. App. 67 (the rule stated to exist
in equity); Klein v. Isaacs (1880) 8 Mo. App. 568; Harvey Lumber Co. v. Herriman
(1889) 39 Mo. App. 215; Duerre v. Reudiger (1895) 65 Mo. App. 407, (dictum);
1an Meter v. Poole (1906) 119 Mo. App. 296, 95 S. NV. 960; Bank v. Bright-Coy etc.
Co. (1909) 139 Mo. App. 110, 120 S. W. 648; Leckie v. Bennett (1911) 160 Mo. App.
145; 141 S. NV. 706; Gate etc. Bank v. Chick (1913) 170 Mo. App. 343, 156 S. NV. 743;
Bank v. Douglass (1913) 178 Mo. App. 664, 161 S. W. 601 (dictum); Boone etc. Co. v.
Niedermeyer (1914) 187 Mo. App. 180, 173 S. W. 54; Miles v. Bank (1914) 187 Mo.
App. 230, 173 S. NV. 713; Shockley v. Booker (1918) 204 S. NV. 569 (dictum). But see
(contra and to be disregarded) Uhrich v. Globe Co. (1915) 191 Mo. App. 111, 166
S. W. 345; Bay v. Williams (1884) 112 111. 91; Lawrence v. Fox (1859) 20 N. Y. 268
("the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox"); see Bank v. Benoist (1847) 10 Mo. 521; Robbins
v. dyres, supra note 4; .monett v. Montague (1876) 63 Mo. 201, (same case (1881) 75
Mo. 43); compare Moseman v. Bender (1883) 80 Mo. 579, where the court erroneously
applied the rule. In Jones v. Miller (1849) 12 Mo. 408, the rule was. recognized, but
the contract between the parties was held invalid, there being no consideration to
support the defendant's promise. The early cases of Thornton v. Smith, Page v.
Becker, and Manny v. Fraser, supra note 6, which are contra, to the foregoing line
of authority must be taken as overruled. In Mellen v. Whipple (1854) 1 Gray (Mass.)
317, it was held that as a general rule a beneficiary could not recover on the contract.
Three exceptions, however, were stated as follows: (1) where A has put money or
property into the hands of B as a fund from which A's creditors are to be paid; (2)
where promises have been made to the father or uncle for the benefit of a child or
nephew (see supra note 6); (3) where a tenant assigns a lease to a defendant who
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said ihat'A is C's trustee, or that the relationship between the parties is
substantially that of trustee and cestui que trust.14 Again it is suggested
that B in making such an agreement acted as C's agent and the latter
is accordingly privileged to ratify the transaction." Finally, statements
are found in the opinions, to the effect that it isjust and proper to enter-
tain an action for C; that the equities are with C." , 17
agrees to pay the rent and enters upon the demised premists. In the first assumed
case, a recovery by the beneficiary would seem to be proper. See statements to the
same effect in State v. St. Louis etc. Co. and Bank v. Bright-Coy etc Co. supra; but in
each instance the statement is to be regarded as unnecessary to the decision. In the
last case (mentioned in Mellen's case) as the covenant ran with the land, it would
seem that the defendant would be liable in any event, and without any special agree-
ment.
14. Follansbee o. Johnson (1881) 28 Minn. 311; Urquhart u. Brayton (1880)
12 R. I. 169: "The duty of the trustee to pay the cestui que trust, according to the
terms of the trust, implies his promise to the latter to do so. In this case the defen-
dant, upon ample consideration * * * * promised Holly to pay his debt to the plaintiff;
the consideration received and the promise to Holly made it as plainly his duty to pay
plaintiff as if the money had been remitted to him for that purpose, and as well
implied a promise to do so if he had been made a trustee of property to be converted
into cash with which to pay." Lawrence o. Fox, supra note 13, 20 N. Y. 1. c. 274. In
Luthy o. Woods, supra note 13, it was held that a contract of this nature did not
create a trust: "As the plaintiff was a mere general creditor, showing no trust,
there was no trust fund*" and therefore no jurisdiction on the distinct ground of
trust." 6 Mo. App. I. c. 69; the action was in equity.
15. Two of the judges in Lawrence v. Fox, supra, note 13, based their decision
on this ground (20 N. Y. 1. c. 275). See also Howsman v. Trenton etc. Co. (1893)
119 Mo. L c. 309, 24 S. W. 784, where there is dictum to the effect that a beneficiary's
right might be based on an implied agency. In several of the Missouri cases it is
said that there is privity if the beneficiary "adopts" the promise made for his benefit,
and occasionally it is intimated that his adoption, until the contrary be proved,
will be presumed. See: Meyer v. Lowell; Rogers v. Gosnell; A4monett u. Montague;
Porter v. Woods; Beardslee v. Morgner; Fitzgerald v. Barker; Bank v. Douglas, supra
note 13. Apparently this conception of a possible adoption is the same as that of an
implied agency. In New York, the theory of an implied agency has been repudiated.
Giffordv. Corrigan (1889) 117 N. Y. 257,22 N. E. 756.
16. "This result involved no injustice to the defendant, but simply holds him to
accountability upon his understanding, according to its evident purpose and intent."
Meyer v. Lowell, supra note 13, 44 Mo. I. c. 331.
17. In cases where a mortgagor grants the mortgaged premises to another,
and the latter assumes the mortgage debt, the courts have developed the peculiar
doctrine that the grantee becomes the principal debtor and the grantor-mortgagor
his surety. It is then held that the mortgagee can look to the grantee for the payment
of the mortgage debt on the "familar doctrine in equity that a creditor shall have the
benefit of any obligation or security given by the principal to the surety for the pay-
ment of the debt." Keller v. 4shford (1890) 133 U. S. 610, 622, 33 L. Ed. 667. In
the case last cited the federal Supreme Court said (p. 623): "The doctrine of the
right of a creditor to the benefit of all securities given by the principal to the surety
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for the payment of the debt does not rest upon any liability of the principal to the
creditor, or upon any peculiar relation of the surety towards the creditor; but upon
the ground that the surety, being the creditor's debtor, and in fact occupying the
relation of surety to another person has received from that person an obligation
or security for the payment of the debt, which a court of equity will therefore compel
to be applied to that purpose at the suit of the creditor. Where the person ulti-
mately held liable is himself a debtor to the creditor, the relief awarded has no
reference to that fact, but is grounded wholly on the right of the creditor to avail
himself of the right of the surety against the principal." Professor Williston (op. cit.
sec. 384) states that "the relief granted is merely the application towards the pay-
ment of the debt by a court of equity of the mortgagor's property, consisting of the
promise running to him from the grantee of the mortgaged premises." Our Supreme
Court has from time to time asserted the proposition that a grantee of mortgaged
premises, assuming the mortgage debt, becomes the principal debtor and the mort-
gagor and prior grantees holding under the mortgagor, who have assumed the
mortgage debt, becomes merely sureties. See to this effect: Orrick v. Durham (1883)
79 Mo. 174 (holding that where a mortgagor pays the debt assumed he is entitled to
be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee, he having as surety paid the principal's
indebtedness); Nelson v. Brown (1897) 140 Mo. 580, 41 S. W. 960 (holding that a
valid extension agreement between the grantee and mortgagee discharged the mort-
gagor, he being merely a surety); Hicks v. Hamilton (1898) 144 Mo. 495, 46 S. NY.
432 (holding that a mortgagee could not recover against a grantee from one holding
under the mortgagor who had not assumed the debt, because defendant's grantee was
not the mortgagee's debtor and was not therefore in the position of a surety; but see
Crone v. Stinde, infra; Pratt u. Conwav (1899) 148 Mo. 291, 49 S. WN. 1028 (dictum)
Regan v. Williams (1904) 185 Mo. 620, 84 S. W. 959 (same case (1901) 88 Mo. App.
577) (extension granted to grantee discharges mortgagor); Higgins a. Evans (1905)
188 Mo. 627, 87 S. W. 973 (a grantee is bound to pay the debt to the mortgagee even
though the mortgagor may have been released because of an extension granted to a
former grantee); Terry v. Groves (1914) 258 Mo. 450,167 S. W. 563 (dictum).
The various Courts of Appeals have likewise stated the same rule. See: Com-
mercial Bank v. Wood (1893) 56 Mo. App. 214 (extension of time to grantee discharges
the mortgagor); Wayman v. Jones (1894) 58 Mo. App. 313 (same facts); Imerican
etc. Bank v. Klock (1894) 58 Mo. App. 335 (dictum); Bank V. Pettit (1900) 85 Mo.
App. 499 (dictum); Smith v. Davis (1901) 90 Mo. App. 533 (action at law by mortga-
gee against grantee to recover a deficiency after foreclosure); Steele v. Johnson (1902)
96 Mo. App. 147, 69 S. IV. 1065 (extension of time to grantee discharges mortgagor);
Hoffman v. Loudon (1902) 96 Mo. App. 185, 70 S. W. 162 (action by mortgagor);
Laumeier v. Hallock (1903) 103 Mo. App. 116, 77 S. W. 347 (extension releases
mortgagor as well as endorser of note); Fender v. Haseltine (1904) 106 Mo. App.28, 79 S. W. 1018 (action by mortgagor); Wonderly a. Giessler (1906) 118 Mo. App.
708, 93 S. W. 1130 (dictum); Priddy v. Miner's Bank (1908) 132 Mo. App. 279,.111
S. W. 865 (dictum); Gerardi v. Christie (1910) 148 Mo. App. 75,127 S. WV. 635 (dictum);
Greer v. Orchard (1913) 175 Mo. App. 494, 161 S. N1. 875 (dictum); Haley v. Branham
(1915) 192 Mo. App. 125, 180 S. W. 423 (dictum); Hildrith v. Walker (1916) 187
S. W. 608 (mortgagor cannot recover from grantee until he has paid the mortgagee);
Speer v, Home Bank (1918) 200 Mo. App. 269, 206 S. WV. 405 (mortgagee may proceed
directly against mortgagor, in which event the relation of principal and surety
exists merely between the parties to the agreement); Dent a. M1atthews (1919) 202
Mo. App. 451, 213 S. W. 141 (dictum).
In Salmon Falls'Bank v. Leyser (1893) 116 Mo. 51, 22 S. W. 504, S sold property
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to B taking B's notes secured by a mortgage upon the chattels. Later B sold the
goods to S who assumed the debt evidenced by the notes. It was held that S became
liable to a transferee of the notes and was the principal debtor. The action was on
the contract to pay the notes. In Citizens Bank v. Douglas (1913) 178 Mo. App. 664,
161 S. W. 601, D assumed C's debt to plaintiff who granted D an extension of time.
It was held that D became the principal debtor and C a mere surety, and that the
extension released C from his obligation to pay the debt. See also accord with the
general principle, Miles v. Bank (1914) 187 Mo. App. 230, 244, 173 S. W. 713. In
the following cases a grantee who assumed the mortgage debt was held liable therefor
at the instance of the mortgagee upon the general ground that the contract of as-
sumption was for the latter's benefit: Cress v. Blodgett (1877) 64 Mo. 449 (dictum);
Fitzgerald v. Barker (1879) 70 Mo. 685 (same case (1884) 85 Mo. 13; (1888) 96 Mo.
661; (1877) 4 Mo. App. 105; (1883) 13 Mo. App. 192); Heim v. Fogel (1879) 69 Mo.
529; Winn v. Lippincott Co. (1894) 125 Mo. 528, 28 S. W. 998 (dictum); Tomlinson v.
Given (1898) 144 Mo. 19, 45 S. W. 645 (dictum); Crone v. 8tinde (1900) 156 Mo. 262,
55 S. W. 863, 56 S. W. 907 (reversing (1896) 68 Mo. App. 122); Klein v. Isaacs (1880)
8 Mo. App. 568; Mcddaras v. King (1881) 10 Mo. App. 577; Drake v. Bageley (1896)
69 Mo. App. 39; Keifer v. Shacklett (1900) 85 Mo. App. 449; Nixon v. Knollenberg
(1901) 92 Mo. App. 20; Curry v. Lafon (1908) 133 Mo. App. 163, 113 S. W. 246.
See also Beardslee u. Morgner (1877) 4 Mo. App. 139; Van Meter v. Poole (1906)
119 Mo. App. 296, 95 S. W. 960; Grace v. Gill (1908) 136 Mo. App. 186, 116 S. W.
442. The early case of Page v. Becker (1862) 31 Mo. 466 and that of Mason v. Fithian
(1865) 36 Mo. 384, which are contra to the rule as stated above must be taken as
overruled. In Hicks v. Hamilton, supra (1898) 144 Mo. 495, the Court said (p. 499):
"The mortgagee is declared to be entitled to enforce for his benefit all 'collateral
obligations for the payment of the debt, which a person standing in the situation of a
surety* * * * has received for his benefit.' As between the parties to the deed, the
grantor becomes the surety, and the grantee the principal debtor. Of course no such
rule could obtain, where the grantor was not, and had never become, bound for the
debt." It was accordingly held in that case that the grantee of the mortgagor's
grantee, the latter not having assumed the debt, could not be held liable for the
debt at the instance of the mortgagee. But there were possibly other reasons for the
decision. In Crone v. Stinde (1900) 156 Mo. 262, 55 S. W. 863, however, the Supreme
Court disapproved the Hicks case, saying (p. 266): "It has always been held by this
court that where one person for a valuable consideration makes a promise to the
person from whom the consideration moves for the benefit of a third person, such
third person may maintain an action in his own name against the promisor on the
promise." In view of the foregoing decisions the writer ventures to say that the
right of the mortgagee to hold the assuming grantee is not based upon rules peculiar
to subrogation and principal and surety. In the Crone case, supra, the grantee's
promisee was not the mortgagee's debtor, hence the latter could not be subrogated
to any right that the promisee had against the grantee. In truth the only justifica-
tion for permitting the creditor-beneficiary to recover is the fact that the defendant
has bound himself contractually in this direction; if he has done this, what difference
can it make what relation his promisee bears to the mortgagee?
The cases cited supra established also the following propositions: (1) that an
extension of time granted to the defendant discharges all others (i. e. the mortgagor
and prior assuming grantees) liable to pay the debt, and (2) if a mortgagor or other
person liable pays the debt he is entitled to be subrogated to the mortgage security
as against the assuming grantee. The cases say that these are the results which flow
from the grantee's becoming the principal debtor and the others becoming sureties.
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A contractual obligation can not be classified as a trust. A trust
exists only in cases where one party has, or is invested with a title for
the benefit of another; where there is a present "grant" of the beneficial
ownership to the beneficiary, the mere legal title being in the trustee. s
Now it is quite evident that in the first assumed case, where A receives a
horse from B in return for his obligation to pay B's debt there are
present none of the elements requisite to the finding of a trust. All that
A receives, he is privileged to keep and use; he is merely bound to give
different property, namely money, at a future date to C. There is,
therefore, no justification for saying that A is C's trustee in any sense.
Even in the second assumed case, that is, where A receives $500 prom-
ising to pay B's debt of a like amount there is no trust, because A does
not receive the money to hold and deliver to C. There would be a trust
in this case if A were under a duty to keep the fund which he received for
the benefit of C. But, absent this attribute, the transliction is only a
contract to pay C money.
It is believed that just because A is under a contract duty to pay C
the same amount that he received from B, as consideration for his
obligation, a court is not warranted in saying that the transaction
is substantially the same as a trust. This is because there is no trust res,
tangible, or intangible. Moreover, as the undertaking on the part of A
As to the first rule, why should not the mortgagor and others liable be discharged in
the event of such an extension on equitable principles, even though the relation of
principal and surety does not exist? The second proposition does not depend upon
the relation of principal and surety in the least. Any one who pays the obligation of
another and who is not an intermedller is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the
creditor against the defaulting debtor. See Hoover v. Epler (1866) 52 Pa. 522. The
authorities seem to admit very generally that the relation of principal and surety
at the outset exists only between the parties to the contract and does not bind the
creditor-beneficiary until he "adopts" in some way or other the transaction. In
other words, a mortgagee may, if he sees fit, sue the mortgagor first. But if he chooses
to sue the assuming grantee first, he must recognize the mortgagor and others liable
as sureties. See: cases cited supra, and especially Smith v. Davis, and Speer V. Home
Bank. In Conn. etc. Co. v. Mayer (1879) 8 Mo. App. 18, defendant was the mortgagor
and conveyed to A who assumed the mortgaged debt. Thereafter the mortgagee
permitted A to remove a part of the mortgaged property thereby depreciating the
value of the security. It was held that the defendant was nevertheless liable as a
principal debtor. Sed qu? Compare Regan v. Williams, supra.
It may well be the fact that the so-called doctrine of subrogation, based upon
the relationship of principal and surety had its origin in equity, but the principle is
recognized now at law. Professor Williston's statement to the effect that the doctrine
merely amounts to allowing the mortgagee to get at one of the mortgagor's assets in an
action in equity (supra) should therefore be broadened. The "asset", it appears, can
be reached equally well at law.
18. Perry, Trusts (6th ed.) sec. 1. See Declarations of Trusts, 27 U. of Mo.
Bulletin, L. Ser. 3 et seq. Williston, op. cit. sec. 355.
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is merely to pay money, the obligation of A normally would not even be
specifically enforceable.
Undoubtedly if B, in exacting from A a promise to discharge his
debt or duty to C, was acting for C, C could ratify the transaction,
and become a party to the contract. The difficulty, in construing the
arrangement in this way and permitting such a ratification, is that the
facts do not seem to bear out or sustain the suggestion. B's aim in
making such a contract would usually be to protect himself; to procure
for his own advantage freedom from liability to suit at the instance of C.
He would be seeking, in a certain sense, to have A save him harmless.
It is hard to believe that under the existing conditions B paid A with
his own money or property as the agent of C for the latter's protection,
and not for his, B's, own personal advantage. It is for these reasons
urged that, unless there is a specific stipulation authorizing C to sue A
on the contract, courts are not justified in finding an implied agency
and allowing C to ratify.19
There are some decisions holding that the agreement between A and
B, in addition to binding A to discharge B's debt, also amounts to an
offer extended to C to novate. Under this theory, if C accepts A's
obligation, B is discharged from his, and there is a substitution of one
contracting party for another. On the other hand, if C declines the
benefits offered by the contract, he will be held to have no right to look
to A foi" the satisfaction of the debt, but A's liability will continue
solely to B.2" If such a construction of the agreement is reasonable, and
19. See however, cases cited, supra note 15.
20. "A agrees with B, for a consideration moving from B, to pay C the debt
which B owes to C.* * * * * The contract, as between A and B, is not collateral, but
substitutional. But, this being so, how does C, who is not a party to it, get the right to
sue A upon or by reason of it? It has been held that he gets this right directly from
the contract itself, because B, in making it with A, makes it for C, if C desires to
accede to it, as well as for himself, so that C has only to ratify or assent to it, which he
does unequivocally by suing on it. But, in this view, if C accepts the contract, he
must accept it as made; that is, as a contract by which A agrees that he, instead of
B, will pay the debt which B owes C. C cannot, at the same time assent to the con-
tract and dissent from the terms of it. Accordingly if he sues A on the contract,
he must sue him instead of B, and cannot also sue B, and B is therefore released."
Wood v. Moriarty (1887) 15 R. I. 518, 521. Placing such a construction on the con-
tract effects some desirable results. It prevents for instance any question of liability
on the defendant's part to two suits. If the creditor recognizes the defendant, this
discharges at once the debtor-promisee. On the other hand, if the beneficiary refuses
to recognize the defendant's assumption of the debt, he will have no rights against
him at all. His rights will be against the promisee-debtor alone, and the latter will be
the one entitled to sue the defendant. If the transaction is not construed as an offer
to novate, it may well be that the defendant will be liable to two suits, one by the
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fairly represents the intentions of the parties, it would be accurate
to say that B, in making the contract, was procuring a privilege for C,
in the form of an offer, of which C could avail himself. In a certain
sense, under such an interpretation, C, by accepting the proposition
extended to him, would be ratifying B's act, done in his behalf.
Again, however, the difficulty in finding this agency is that it is
unreasonable to construe the arrangement as an offer to novate. Con-
ceding that C should be given a right as beneficiary under the bargain,
what is there in the transaction to cause C to believe that there is an
implied condition to the effect that his proceeding against A will dis-
charge B? What is there, in the nature of the transaction, to cause B
reasonably to assume that C will know if he, C, does sue A, his right as a
creditor of B will be lost? B is not justified in such an assumption; nor
should C be held to such a condition. If it is to be the rule that C has
any right against A, it should be regarded as a new and cumulative one;
as one in addition to that which he already has against B, and which, if
exercised, will in no wise disturb the existence of B's original obligation
to him.2'
The problem still remains of determining whether or not there are
any so-called "equities", in favor of C, of such a nature as to require a
court to allow him to sue on a contract. As already noted, there are
statements contained in the decisions that the parties intended that C
should have a right to sue and because of this there is no justice in
denying him this power. Occasionally it is also said that allowing C to
hold A prevents circuity of action.2- It seems certain that if this were
the real intention of the parties, C should be afforded his remedy. Con-
beneficiary, and one by the promisee. Did the defendant intend to assume a liability
to this extent? It is believed that, as a rule, he did not.
21. Williston, op. cit. sec. 353; Corbin's Anson on Contracts 347, where the
learned editor says "the beneficiary has no reason to believe that in taking advantage
of the new contract he is extinguishing his previous rights." See also Harrey v.
Lumber Co. (1890) 39 Mo. App. 214 and Citizens Bank v. Douglas (1913) 178 Mo.
App. 664, 161 S. W. 601, where it is stated that there is no novation even after the
obligation of the defendant is recognized by the beneficiary. Compare Pratt v.
Conway (1899) 148 Mo. 291, 49 S. W. 1028; Shepherd v. Afay (1885) I15 U. S. 505,
29 L. Ed. 456.
22. "It (i. e. the doctrine allowing a creditor-beneficiary to sue) has been ac-
cepted here, as it most of the American States, because it is supposed to furnish a
useful rule in practice, tending to simplify litigation. By following it, one action often
effects the same results that two would be required to accomplish without it."
Ellis v. Harrison, supra note 13, 104 Mo. . c. 277. The same reason was advanced in
Lawrence v. Fox, supra note 13. It is also stated in the Ellis case supra (I. c. 277) that
the creditor-beneficiary is the real party in interest under the Missouri statute
(now sec. 1156 R. S. Mo. 1919). But this does not necessarily result from the making
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versely, if it were not, the action should not lie, even though the result of
allowing it is an accidental prevention of circuity of action. There is no
justice in changing a contractual obligation just because the change saves
time. Moreover, allowing the action, where it was not agreed to, may
result in subjecting A to two suits, where only one was intended to be
possible, if the rights of B, under the contract, are fully recognized, as of
course they should be.
Unless the contract expressly provides that C may sue A, there
seems no reason for concluding that the intention of either of the parties
was to give C such a right, and it is therefore believed that decisions
denying C an action are the better ones. 3 It is not even plausible to say
that B was making a gift to C of any kind. As a matter of fact, in most
of the contract. As Professor Williston has well said (op. cit. sec. 366): "The difficult
question is whether the third person is the real party in interest. It is a question of
substantive law as to the existence of rights rather than of procedure appropriate for
their enforcement. * * * The provision (i. e. the "real party in interest statute")
has served in some states to add another element of confusion."
23. See supra note 6 and cases there cited. The Missouri cases all admit that a
beneficiary should not be allowed an action unless the parties to the contract intended
to afford him such a right, yet in view of the long line of authority allowing a creditor
to sue (see supra note 13) it must be taken as established law that in the absence of an
express provision to the contrary, it will be presumed that such a right was intended
to be vested in the creditor. Occasionally, but not often, an inconsistent statement
is to be found in the cases. In State v. St. Louis etc. Co. (1894) 125 Mo. 1. c. 617, 28
S. W. 1074, the Supreme Court said, "To entitle a third person to sue it must clearly
appear that the contract was made for the benefit of such third person or persons, as
one of its principal objects. A mere indirect or incidental benefit is not sufficient."
In that case defendant agreed to save the promisee-debtor harmless from obligations
and "to pay and surrender the same cancelled and discharged" to the promisee. It
was held that this was a mere contract of indemnity and that for this reason the
creditor could not sue as a beneficiary." * * these words ("pay and surrender" etc.)
were subordinate to the agreement to save harmless. * * * They cannot have the
effect to change the agreement from one of indemnity to a contract made for the
benefit of third persons." Id. 619. Authority abounds to the effect that a contract
to indemnify and save a debtor harmless vests no right in a creditor to sue; see for
example: City v. Blumb (1889) 99 Mo. 357, 12 S. W. 791; Hilly. Omaha etc. Co. (1899)
82 Mo. App. 188; Carpenter v. Realty Co. (1903) 103 Mo. App. 402, 77 S. W. 1004;
Uhrich v. Globe Works (1915) 191 Mo. App. 111, 166 S. W. 845; see also O'Connell V.
Trust Co. (1912) 165 Mo. App. 398, 147 S. W. 841. In Street v. Johnson (1898) 77 Mo.
App. 318, a contract was alleged whereby defendant bound himself to pay checks drawn
on him by his promisee. In an action by a payee of such a check it was held that
plaintiff could not recover and intimated that such a contract was not intended to be
for the benefit of plaintiff. But this suggestion seems clearly out of line with the
cases cited supra note 13. It would seem then (1) that a contract to pay the promisee's
debt gives a beneficiary a right to sue; (2) that a contract to save harmless gives no
such right; and (3) that a contract to pay and indemnify gives no such right. The
writer ventures to suggest that in all three types of cases the purpose of the contract
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cases, B's scheme was to save himself from trouble, and that alone. He
asked A to pay his debt; the contract's purpose was to save him harm-
less. True, the performance by A will incidentally benefit C, but this
fact, standing alone, should not give him a right to enforce the obliga-
tion. In such a case as that assumed most courts would hold that dam-
ages would accrue to B as soon as A failed to pay the debt, and B him-
self should have a right to sue at once.24 It is not reasonable to assume
that A undertook liability to suit at the instance of both B and C, but if
C is permitted to sue this will be the result so far as A is concerned un-
less, indeed, some mechanical rule be adopted providing that, if one
party sues A, the other thereafter will be precluded from so doing.p
Perhaps in this sort of case, if C brings an action against A and does
not molest B, C's judgment against A, if satisfied, will likewise satisfy
B's injury; the result under this supposition will be that B's debt will
be fully paid, and he will have no grounds to fear an action against
himself by C. But suppose that C remains passive for a protracted
period and does not sue either party, B then should surely have a right
to proceed against A; suppose that B does and his judgment goes un-
paid, could C thereafter, if it seemed desirable also sue A? If he could
not, what theory, consistent with the rights of a creditor-beneficiary
intervenes to prevent such action?
is identical, and the intention is the same; that there is no intention in any of the
cases to give the creditor-beneficiary a right to sue; that if the decision in State V. St.
Louis Co., supra, is correct (and it is submitted that it is) the decisions cited supra
note 13 allowing a creditor to recover where the defendant agrees to pay the promis-
ee's debt are wrong. The contract in the St. Louis Co. case merely described more
fully and aptly the intention of the parties. But the intention of the parties in all
cases of this class is in reality the same. "The object of such a contract must always
be primarily, and generally solely, to secure an advantage to the promisee. He wishes
to be relieved from liability and he exacts a promise to pay the third person only
because that is a way of relieving himself." Williston, op. cit. sec. 361. National
Bank v. Grand Lodge (1878) 98 U. S. 123. But see Corbin, op. cit. secs. 289, 295.
In Van Meter v. Poole (1906) 119 Mo. App. 296, 95 S. W. 960, it was held that a
contract to pay a promisee's debt was for the benefit of the promisee's surety, who
could sue thereon. Did the promisee in making such an agreement intend to benefit
his surety; if he did, did he likewise intend to vest a right to sue in his creditor?
Sometimes it would seem that all a court requires to allow a creditor to sue is the fact
that he is a creditor.
24. Sedgwick, Damages sec. 789 etseq; Williston, op. cit. sec. 1408: Ham v. Hill
(1860) 29 Mo. 275; Loosemore v. Radford (1842) 9 M. & W. 657. But in Hildrth v.
Walker, supra note 17, 187 S. W. 608, it was held that a mortgagor could not recover
from his promisor until he had paid the assumed debt. This decision is not in line
with the usual holding, although it has been suggested that such should be the rule.
Sedgwick op. cit. sec. 790.
.25. As to this, see infra, note 57 and text in connection therewith.
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Again, it might happen that C will sue A and recover judgment,
but the same will go unsatisfied; that C will then sue B and procure
payment; should not B under these conditions, if a turn for the better
occurs in A's fortunes, be free to sue A and recover for the debt, which
he should not have been compelled to pay? He should have such a
right; yet if the second action be entertained, A is once more subjected
to two suits, whereas it seems safe to say he assumed only one liability.
The matter is not so simple as it appears, and it is not to be disposed of
by an offhand statement that C's action will prevent circuity of action,
or that there are broad equities of one kind of another in favor of C.
There is still another type of case where it appears that there may be
two suits against a defendant, only one being intended. Suppose that M
holds land subject to a mortgage in favor of X for $10,000. Suppose that
for a valid and adequate consideration N agrees with M to discharge this
mortgage debt and that the purpose of this agreement, known to N, is to
enable M to carry out a contract to convey the premises to Z free and
clear. In such a case if N breaches the agreement, under the prevailing
rule, X can sue N and recover the amount of the mortgage debt. But
suppose that Z refuses to perform and the land is not saleable in the
market for the price which M was to get under his contract of sale; in
such a case it would be only just to allow M to sue N and recover the
amount of profits which he would have received, had he been able to
carry out his bargain, which N alone has prevented. Yet it is submitted
that N never intended a dual liability of this kind, and forcing him to
respond to two suits is unjust and unwarranted. It would be correct to
say in all cases where a promisee seeks, in addition to the discharge of his
obligation to the beneficiary, a further advantage to himself, that two
suits may be inevitable, contrary to the intended obligation of the
promisor, if the promisee's rights are to be fully protected. For this
reason, allowing a beneficiary to sue in this class of cases is especially
objectionable.
Professor Williston in his very excellent treatise on the law of
contracts, while he does not approve the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox"O
which allows a creditor-beneficiary to sue at law and recover the amount
of the assumed debt, 7 at the same time submits that such a party
should be allowed to sue in equity, both the promisor and the promisee
being made parties defendant.' The learned author would have the
courts proceed on the theory that a promisor's promise to pay his
promisee's debt is an increase in the assets of the promisee, which the
26. (1859) 20 N. Y. 268.
27. Williston, op. cit. sec. 361.
28. Williston, op. cit. sec. 363.
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law should be able to reach and apply to the payment of the creditor-
beneficiary's claim. It is urged that as this "asset" of the promitee-
debtor can not be reached through garnishment the remedy afforded at
law is inadequate, and equity should therefore intervene. 9 It is also
said that as "the promisee is a party to the litigation, his right will be
concluded by such a decree (i. e. by one in favor of, or against the
creditor) and the promisor will not be subjected to the hardship of
the possibility of two actions against him by virtue of one promise."3 0
To sustain the foregoing suggestions, Professor Williston intimates
that the promisor's promise is an "asset" which the creditor-beneficiary
alone may avail himself of as the promise is to pay this particular debt.3'
If this suggestion were true, there might be some justification for per-
mitting such a beneficiary to sue in equity, his action being somewhat
analogous to "equitable execution." But the writer ventures to question
the soundness of Professor Williston's premise. This "asset" is not
deemed to be an asset peculiarly applicable to the payment of the
creditor-beneficiary's claim. There is considerable authority to the
effect that the breach of the agreement entities the promisee to recover
the full amount of the debt even though he has not paid the creditor-
beneficiary.n Surely such a claim when realized by the promisee would
constitute general assets, and could not be appropriated to the payment
of the beneficiary's claim to the exclusion of all others. The fact that
prior to a breach of the contract the promisor was obligated to pay
money to the beneficiary, and not to render any other performance to
the promisee does not appear to be material, because, prior to breach,
29. Williston, op. cit. sec. 362..
30. Williston, op. cit. sec. 362. Suppose that the beneficiary sues and the
promisee also claims and is entitled t6 damages; will these damages also be collectible
in this action? There would seem to be no real objection to compelling thepromisee
to assert and collect for any injury suffered at this time or else be precluded from
ever thereafter asserting such a right.
31. "If a solvent promisor has agreed to discharge a debt of the promisee to the
amount of a thousand dollars, it is as real an increase of the assets of the promisee as a.
promise to pay the latter directly that sum, or indeed as the actual payment there-
of." Williston, op. cit. sec. 362. "It is, then, a peculiarity in regard to the application
of such a promise to the debt of the promisee, that the promise is an asset of which
not every creditor can take advantage * * * certainly so long as a promise to pay
A's debt to B is not broken, it cannot be made available to any creditor except B,
since the promisor cannot be required to do anything other than what he promised."
Id. sec. 363. But concealing the learned author's statement, prior to breach the
promisor is not liable to any one. After breach he is liable to A; his failure to pay B
has damaged A; is B peculiarly entitled to those damages? It is thought that B is not.
32. See supra note 24.
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neither party would have a right to sue the promisor, and after breach,
as already noted, damages accrue to the promisee.3
As to Professor Williston's argument that the creditor-beneficiary
should be entitled to sue in equity because no remedy exists under the
usual garnishment statute, it would seem that the St. Louis Court of
Appeals has well answered that by saying, "Equity does not supple-
ment the statutory law, or where from motives of policy the Legislature
have denied a remedy, afford what has thus been denied."34
II
Suppose that A, for a good and sufficient consideration, moving
from B, agrees with B to render a performance to C, which will not
materially benefit B, and that such performance will not constitute a
discharge of any duty owing by B to C. It would seem that under this
state of facts, C ought to be able to sue A, in the event of a breach, in an
action sounding in assumpsit and recover. There is authority so holding,
and it is considered sound." If a careful analysis of the transaction be
made, it will be found that B's only reasonable purpose in making such
33. Professor Williston seems to recognize this suggested difficulty for he says
(op. cit. sec. 363): "It may also be urged that after breach of his contract the promi-
sor, even though B (the creditor-beneficiary) has not been paid, a right of action
for damages arises in favor of the promisee of which he could avail himself for his own
advantage; and, of which therefore, any creditor should be able to avail himself."
34. Luthy v. Woods (1878) 6 Mo. App. I. c. 70. But in Pendleton v. Perkins
(1872) 49 Mo. 565, it was held that a creditor could bring his bill against an abscond-
ing debtor, whose property could not be gotten at under the garnishment statute. It is
suggested in the Luthy case that a creditor-beneficiary should not be able to proceed
in equity in any event unless he had first recovered his judgment in a legal action;
but see same case (1876) 1 Mo. App. 167, where the court decided contra. The usual
rule is that a creditor must so reduce his claim. See Coleman u. Hagey (1913) 252 Mo.
102, 158 S. W. 829. The reason usually advanced to support the rule is that the claim
which it is sought to have satisfied should be litigated at law; the defendant is en-
titled to a trial at law; see Taylor v. Bowker (1884) Ill U. S. 110, 28 L. Ed. 368
Compare Merchants etc. Bank v. Paine (1882) 13 R. 1. 592. If the theory of the
creditor-beneficiary's right is as suggested by Professor Williston, why should he
not be required first to obtain his judgment at law, before pursuing his remedy in
equity in pursuit of his debtor's asset?
35. Heim v. Vogel (1879) 69 Mo. 529; Crone v. Stinde (1900) 156 Mo. 262, 55
S. W. 863, (reversing same case (1896) 68 Mo. App. 122; and Hicks v. Hlamilton
(1898) 144 Mo. 495,46 S. W. 432); Barhoro . OccidentalGrove (1877) 4 Mo. App. 429;
Lampert v. Laclede etc. Co. (1883) 14 Mo. App. 376; Scheele v. Bank (1906) 120 Mo.
App. 611, 97 S. W. 621; Howardv. Hardy (1907) 128 Mo. App. 349; 107 S. W. 466;
Fellows o. Kreutz (1915) 189 Mo. App. 547, 176 S. W. 1080.
The case under review would seem to be in accord with the foregoing authorities
and is believed to be sound. Compare (accord in principle) Board v. Woods (1883)
77 Mo. 197; Snider v. Adams etc. Co. (1876) 63 Mo. 376; State ex reL. v. Laclede etc.
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a bargain must have been to benefit not himself but C. If A were to
break the agreement, what loss could B show that he had suffered?
Nothing was to come to him, measurable in dollars and cents, through
performance by A. In fact, if B were to sue A for violating his agree-
ment, it is not perceived how he could recover more than nominal
damages.36 For these reasons, neither party to the contract should be
heard to say that it was not made to benefit C, and the latter, upon
principles heretofore discussed,37 should be allowed to sue in contract.
Strange as it may seem, courts have been reluctant to allow a
"gift beneficiary" an action against the promisor. It has been said that
no beneficiary may sue on a contract unless the performance undertaken
to be rendered was to discharge a duty running from the promisee to the
beneficiary; that the debtor-creditor relationship between the promisee
Co. (1890) 102 Mo. 472, 14 S. W. 974; City v. Howard (1899) 149 Mo. 504, 51 S. W.
94. In Crone v. Stinde, supra, the Court said (156 Mo. I. e. 269): "Nor do we think an
action can not be maintained by a person for whose benefit a contract is made by
others upon a valuable consideration, although he is not a party thereto, provided
he adopts it. The consideration passing between the two contracting parties, by
which one of them promises to pay a third, is just as available to the beneficiary as if
he himself had paid the consideration."
In Markel v. Western Union Co. (1885) 19 Mo. App. 80, a sendee of a telegram
was denied a right to recover upon the contract between the defendant and the
sender to deliver the telegram. In such a case the contract is for the benefit of the
sender (or usually is) and there is no debtor-creditor relationship between the de-
fendant's promisee and the sendee. But if a creditor-beneficiary may recover (which
he can do) why can not a sendee of the telegram? There is authority contra which at
least is consistent with the creditor-beneficiary cases; see Williston, oP. cit. sec. 376
and cases cited. In St. Louis etc. Co. o. Mo. Pac. Co. (1889) 35 Mo. App. 272, defen-
dant railroad agreed with a shipper to transfer goods to plaintiff's line. It was held
that plaintiff could not recover. Performance again benefited the promisee. In
Bissellv. Roden (1863) 34 Mo. 63, plaintiff employed B and C to build a house, and
B and C employed defendant to do the plumbing work. It was held that plaintiff
could not recover; it was said that the contract was for the benefit of B. and C.
Perhaps in this case nothing was to be rendered to plaintiff, and performance bene-
fited the promisee; otherwise the only distinction between this case and the creditor-
beneficiary cases is that there was no debtor-creditor relationship. It should be
noted that in all jurisdictions a beneficiary under an insurance policy may sue;
Williston, op. cit. sec. 369. Such a contract best illustrates the particular transaction
under discussion. Yet, as Professor Williston points out the courts have paid little
attention to this controlling fact.
36. Williston, op. cit. sec. 357. Of course if the promisee sues as a trustee under
R. S. Mo. 1919 sec. 1156, he will recover to the amount of the loss occasioned the
beneficiary, but for the benefit of the latter; see supra note 6.
37. See supra note 12 and text in connection therewith; Crone v. Slinde, supra
note 35.
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and beneficiary is essential to the latter's right to sue.38 It is rather
difficult to get at the bottom of this notion. Perhaps the idea is to be
explained on the ground that an action by a creditor-beneficiary was
usually first recognized, and the theory of the beneficiary's rights first
formulated in connection with contracts where the debtor-creditor
relationship existed. Sometimes it is said that without this relationship
there is no privity between the beneficiary and the promisee.39 But after
38. Probably the case most often cited to sustain this view is that of Prooman
v. Turner (1877) 69 N. Y. 280, 25 Am. Rep. 95; there a defendant-grantee assumed a
mortgage debt, his grantor not being liable to pay the same. It was held that the
mortgagee could not recover because there was no debtor-creditor relationship
between the promisee and defendant. Said the court (p. 285): "* * * there must
be a legal right, founded upon some obligation of the promisee, in the third party,
to adopt and claim the promise as made for his benefit." Again the court said (p. 285):
"* * * in every case in which an action has been sustained there has been a debt or
duty owing by the promisee to the party claiming to sue upon the promise." This
proposition has had a marked influence upon the Missouri cases; see, for example,
Crone v. Stinde, supra note 35, 68 Mo. App. 122, 55 S. W. 863, holding with the
Vrooman case. But Crone's case was overruled by the Supreme Court (supra note 35).
It is to be hoped that the case under review will end for all time the contention that a
beneficiary must be a creditor of the promisee in order to sue. At various times the
Missouri courts have justified a suit by a beneficiary who was not a creditor
on the ground that the promisee owed the former a moral duty. The courts have
seemed to feel that some kind of a duty "moral", or otherwise, is essential to cure the
defect of "lack of privity", (whatever that term may mean in this connection). See:
City v. ron Phul (1895) 133 Mo. 561, 34 S. W. 843; Devers v. Howard (1898) 144 Mo.
671, 46 S. W. 625; Kansas City v. Schroeder (1906) 196 Mo. 281, 93 S. W. 405;
Glencoe etc. Co. v. Wind (1900) 86 Mo. App. 163: Bu, falo etc. Co. o. Cullen etc. Co.
(1904) 105 Mo. App. 484, 79 S. W. 1024. In the following cases a beneficiary was
denied a right to recover because there was no debtor-creditor relationship between
him and the promisee; K. C. etc. Co. u. Thompson (1894) 120 Mo. 218, 25 S. W. 522
(but there were other controlling reasons for the decision); Armstrong V. School
District(1887) 28 Mo. App. 169; Harbergu. Arnold(1898) 78 Mo. App. 237. Compare
Street v. Johnson (1898) 77 Mo. App. 318. In Phoenix etc. Co. v. Trenton etc. Co.
(1890) 42 Mo. App. 118, and Howsmon v. Trenton etc. Co. (1893) 119 Mo. 304, 24
S. W. 784, defendant agreed with a city to keep an adequate supply of water for
putting out fires; it was held in each case that a property owner whose property
-was destroyed by fire because of an inadequate water supply could not hold the
defendant. The court in each instance said that the city-promisee owed no duty to
owners in this direction. See Corbin, Liability of Water Companies, 19 Yale L. J.
425. The cases are generally in accord. Professor Costigan says (Cases, Contracts 621
n.): "The courts seem to fear, unnecessarily, that if they allow a recovery, they will be
turning water companies into fire insurance companies. That fear undoubtedly has
played its part in causing the great majority of courts to decide against a recovery
by the individual citizen and property owner." It is submitted that as a matter of
principle, Professor Costigan is correct; the property owner is a real beneficiary and
should recover, all matters of policy aside.
39. "It is sufficient in order to create the necessary privity that the promisee
owe to the party to be benefited some obligation or duty, legal or equitable (does
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all, "privity of contract" is nothing but a phrase, when used in discussing
this type of contract and a beneficiary's rights thereunder. All that it
should mean is that the law is willing to allow a person, who is intended to
have a contract right, such a right, even though he is not a party to the
agreement whence the right sprang. As such an intention must be present
in this class of cases (otherwise, the contract would serve no useful pur-
pose) privity must be present. Again it is said that no beneficiary may
sue unless it is clear that he was intended to have such a right. 0 This,
of course, is true, but the contention, in reality, is nothing but the same
argument over again expressed in a different way. Probably, the best
explanation of this rather extraordinary limitation upon the rule is the
fact that there has existed (and rightly so"l) considerable dissatisfaction
with, and doubt as to the soundness of the rule permitted a creditor-
beneficiary to sue for a breach of the agreement, and because of this,
the courts have been loath to extend the doctrine to other cases, where
as a matter of fact, its application would be entirely unobjectionable.42
III
Conceding that a contract is of the nature to entitle a beneficiary
to sue thereon, under the authorities, it must not be forgotten that his
rights are derivative, just as much so as if he were the assignee suing in
the right of the promisee. Unless, therefore, the contract between the
parties is valid, he will not be entitled to sue thereon; all legal requsites
to the existence of an enforceable contractual obligation must be present.
There would be no propriety in permitting a beneficiary to sue unless
he can show that the defendant-promisor should be bound upon princi-
,ples of contract law. He must show that the promisee procured for him
a valid contractual obligation, and not merely a promise subject to
some legal defense.4 The possible fact that a beneficiary may have known
of the promise for his benefit, and have relied thereon to his detriment,
"equitable" mean "moral"?) which would give him a just claim." City v. Von Phul,
.supra note 38,133 Mo. . c. 565. See supra note 38.
40. See cases cited supra, note 38, especially Vrooman v. Turner.
41. See supra, text following note 13.
42. In Frooman v. Turner, supra note 38, th e court said (69 N. Y. L c. 285,
25 Am. Rep. 195) "The courts are not inclined to extend the doctrine of Lawrence
-. Fox (supra note 13) to cases not clearly within the principle of that decision."
43. Raithel v. Smith (1878) 68 Mo. 258; Saunders V. McClintock (1891) 46
Mo. App. 216; American etc. Bank v. Klock (1894) 58 Mo. App. 335; Davis a. Dunn
(1906) 121 Mo. App. 490, 97 S. W. 226; Frase v. Lee (1910) 152 Mo. App. 562, 134
S. W. 10; Llewellyn v. Butler (1915) 186 Mo. App. 525, 172 S. W. 413; Johnson V.
Maier (1916) 194 Mo. App. 169, 187 S. W. 143; Episcopal Mission v. Brown (1894)
158 U. S. 222, 39 L. Ed. 960;.Arnold v. Nichols (1876) 64N. . 117; Williston, op. cit.
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believing that the defendant was bound to perform should make no
difference, and his action nevertheless should be subject to all the
usually prevailing defenses in an action by a promisee against his prom-
isor."
sec. 394. Compare Jones v. Miller (1849) 12 Mo. 408; Ellis v. Harrison (1891) 104
Mo. 270, 16 S. W. 198 (dictum); Gate Bank v. Chick (1913) 170 Mo. App. 343, 156
S. W. 743. In School District v. Livers (1898) 147 Mo. 580,49 S. W. 507, defendant was
surety on a contractor's bond; the contractor agreed to pay all materialmcn, and
failed to do so. Plaintiff was a materialman and was not paid and sued defendant.
Defendant's bond stated that it was for the protection of parties furnishing material.
Defendant pleaded and proved that his promisee had breached the agreement
materially, but the court allowed plaintiff to recover, holding that defendant made a
separate agreement with plaintiff, promising him in effect to pay if the contractor
failed to pay. Udless there were two contracts (and this seems mor e than doubtful)
the decision cannot be sustained.
In Crone v. Stinde, supra, (1896) 68 Mo. App. 122, note 35, defendant assumed a
mortgage debt, his promisee not being bound to pay the same. The court held that
the creditor could recover, but that his damages would be merely nominal because
his right was derivative, and because the promisee (from whom his right was derived)
could recover only nominal damages. This decision (overruled by the Supreme Court,
supra note 35, 156 Mo. 262) shows an entire misapprehension of the meaning of the
rule that a beneficiary's rights are derivative. All that the proposition means is that
unless the defendant is contractually bound to perform, the beneficiary may not sue.
The right comes from the contract between the defendant and his promisee, and is
derived from that. It does not follow that because there is a good contract right
thus derived that the beneficiary's right is identical in amount with that of the
promisee. If A pays B $10 to deliver a watch to C, C has a valid power to sue B;
he derives this right from the contract made by B with A. His damages are the value
of the watch. A's rights are very different. Probably he should recover nothing,
because he intended to get no value from B's performance. At most, he should get
only nominal damages for B's breach. It is not correct to say that because C's
rights are derived from the A-B contract, that C's remedy is confined to recovering
merely the amount that A could recover. The decision in Crone's case, supra, by
the Court of Appeals is not to be regarded as sound, or as representing the law.
44. Suppose that the debt assumed by a defendant is evidenced by a negotiable
instrument and comes into the hands of a holder in due course who is the plaintiff
beneficiary; should such a holder be able to hold the defendant regardless of whether
or not the latter has a defense against his promisee which would defeat a recovery
by the promisee on the contract of assumption? This question was answered in the
affirmative in Fitzgerald v. Barker (1888) 96 Mo. 661, 10 S. W. 45. But in that case
plaintiff at the time that he purchased the assumed note knew of the assumption by
defendant. In Ymerican etc. Bank o. Klock (1894) 58 Mo. App. 335, 343, the Kansas
City Court of Appeals said: "But we are much disinclined to say that such a promise
(i. e. to pay a debt) possesses the negotiable qualities, incidents and attributes which
pertain to the note to which it relates. The promisor who thus assumes the payment
of a note * * * is in no worse position when sued by the third party for whose benefit
the promise is made than if he had been sued by the grantor (i. e. the promisee) in the
deed. In the absence of an estoppel, such third party in attempting to enforce the
promise * * is in no better position than the original party, since his right is derivative
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The perplexing question remains as to the point of time at which a
beneficiary acquires his right under a contract made for his benefit.
In the case of a gift beneficiary, the right should be regarded as vested
as soon as the agreement is made, subject only to the beneficiary's
disclaimer, which of course would preclude him from asserting any
powers or privileges. 4  So far as the parties to the agreement are con-
cerned this seems to be their intention; the undertaking exacted from
the promisor is to confer a benefit on the beneficiary, and the obligation
to perform is fixed at that time. What objection can there be to holding
that a gift of the obligation is then consummated, and acceptance
thereof (as" in other like cases46) by the beneficiary will be presumed
until the contrary is shown?
Turning to the cases where the beneficiary is the creditor of the
promisee and the agreement is to discharge the promisee's obligation,
there should be no reason for applying a different rule than in the case
where the beneficiary is the promisee's donee; his ight should be con-
sidered as vested as soon as the agreement is completed between the
parties, and his assent to privileges thereunder should likewise be pre-
sumed.47 The possible justification for permitting such a beneficiary to
and he stands in the shoes of the promisee. * * * ** * By an examinationofFizgeraldo.
Barker *** it will be noticed that the note assumed was purchased by the plaintiff
in that case after the deed reciting the assumption of the note was filed for record.
Presumably the purchase was made with a knowledge of its having been assumed " ' *
and on the faith thereof." See also Saunders v. lfcClintock (1891) 46 Mo. App. 216,
226, denying negotiability to the contract of assumption in the absence of an estoppel.
It is urged that defendant ought to be free to set up any defense against the benefici-
ary that he would be free to set up against his promisee in the absence of an express
or implied representation to the effect that he is absolutely bound, on the faith of
which the beneficiary purchases the note. The mere fact that the beneficiary knows of
the agreement at the time that he purchases the negotiable instrument should not
give him any superior rights against the defendant. He is not buying the defendant's
promise and is not a bonafide purchaser thereof in any sense; if the promise is binding
on the defendant then he may avail himself thereof, but not otherwise. The decision
in Fitzgerald v. Barker, supra, is unfortunate and an illogical extension of the doc-
trine allowing a creditor-beneficiary a right to sue.
45. Central Bank v. Hume (1888) 128 U. S. 195; Henderson a. McDonald (1882)
84 Ind. 149. Contra, holding the contract rescindable until acted upon the by bene-
liciary, Peoples Bank o. F'eidinger (1906) 73 N. J. L. 433,64 Ad. 179.
46. See Williston, op. cit. sec. 396, and cases cited. As Professor Williston
suggests, "The question is analogous to that arising upon a gift of property or the
creation of a trust for the benefit of another. As a gift is a pure benefit to the donee,
there seems no reason why his assent should not be presumed, unless and until he
expresses dissent."
47. "It is a presumption of law that when a promise is made for the benefit of
a third person he accepts it, and to overthrow this presumption a dissent must be
shown." Rogers v. Gosnell (1875) 58 Mo. 589, 591. See also Klein P. Isaacs (1889) 8
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sue is because the law finds that the parties to the contract intended to
give him such power, or because (which amounts to the same thing)
courts will not hear the defendant-promisor say that he did not assume
such an obligation, thereby establishing a so-called "privity" of con-
tract.48 If such be the nature of the beneficiary's rights it is not per-
ceived why the power to sue should not be recognized as vesting at once
upon the completion of the transaction. Of course if the creditor-
beneficiary's right to sue is predicated upon an agency,49 or upon the
acceptance of an offer to novate, 0 his right would not be complete until
he recognized what had been done for him, either by ratifying the act
done in his behalf, or by accepting the offer extended to him. It would
seem that bringing an action against a defendant-promisor would
accomplish either of these ends, and that also giving notice of assent to
the arrangement would be equally effective.
The matter above discussed becomes of importance, and is dealt
with in cases where the parties to the agreement have either attempted
its recission, or to release the promisor-defendant from his obligation,
thereby, in each instance, depriving the beneficiary of his right to sue.
As already noted, some cases (dealing with both types of beneficiaries)
hold the right vested as soon as the contract is completed," and these
decisions are considered sound. Yet there is no unanimity of decision;
authority can be found which holds that a beneficiary's rights are des-
tructible before he knows of the contract; 2 others hold that he must
know and assent to the agreement;5 still other cases hold that he must
change his position, as if the contract were the basis for an estoppel, it
Mo. App. 568. In .Amonett v. Montague (1881) 75 Mo. 43, there is dictum that a
creditor-beneficiary's right is destructible until he has assented thereto. See accord
with the suggestion in the text: Bay v. Williams (1884) 112 Ill. 91; Tweedda¢ v.
Tweeddale (1903) 116 Wis. 517, 93 N. W. 440.
48. As already intimated, there is not in this class of case any real intention to
benefit the creditor-beneficiary. See supra note 13 and text in connection therewith.
"But where a debt already exists from one person to another, a promise by a third
person to pay such a debt being primarily for the benefit of the original debtor, and
to relieve him from liability to pay it (there being no novation), he has a right of
action against the promisor for his own indemnity; and if the original creditor can
also sue, the promisor would be liable to two separate actions, and therefore the
rule is that the original creditor cannot sue." National Bank v. Grand Lodge (1878)
98 U. S. 123, 124,25 L. Ed. 75.
49. See supra, note 15 and text in connection therewith.
50. See supra, note 20 and text in connection therewith. Wood v. Moriarty
(1887) 15 R. I. 518;see also, Bohanon v. Pope (1856) 42 Me. 93.
51. See supra notes 45 and 47.
52. Hill v. Hoeldtke (1912) 104 Tex. 594, 142 S. W. 871.
53. Giffordv. Corrigan (1889) 117 N.Y. 257, 22 N. E. 756.
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becoming effective as such when detriment to the beneficiary is shown.54
It is impossible to reconcile all the various holdings. The truth is that
the courts in dealing with this phase of the situation have failed to keep
in mind the nature of the contract, and the basis on which the benefic-
iary's rights have been developed and recognizedY4
IV
Whenever a beneficiary is given a right to sue a defendant-promisor
it becomes necessary to determine whether or not the latter is liable
also to his promisee. If the beneficiary may sue, may the promisee also
have this privilege? In the case of a donee-beneficiary, there is really
no reason for allowing the promisee to recover for a breach of the agree-
ment. As heretofore suggested, if he were granted such a right, his
recovery should be only nominal, because he does not appear to have
intended to procure any benefit for himself.5 The correct rule, therefore,
54. Crowell v. Currier (1876) 27 N. J. Eq. 152. "But in Crowdl v. Currier * 0
it was held that a rescission was permissable because the third party had not altered
his position, the court apparently requiring something-like an estoppel to prevent a
rescission. * * *" 1 Williston, Cases on Contracts (1st ed.) 410 n. Ferris v. W~ater Co.
(1881) 16 Nev. 44.
54a. Professor Williston (Williston, Contracts sec. 397) urges that where the
contract is to pay the promisee's debt, due the beneficiary, the parties to the agree-
ment ought to be free to rescind the same unless the promisee is insolvent and the
promisee receives an inadequate consideration for releasing the promisor. "The
promisor to the debtor to pay the debt is a valuable right belonging to the debtor.
Like his other property the debtor has no right to give it away if he thereby deprives
himself of sufficient means to pay his debt. Even though insolvent, however, he has
a right to change the form of his assets. Consequently to a rescission or release for
adquate consideration paid to the debtor, the creditor should never have a right to
object." To sustain his suggestion, Professor Williston cites three cases (Trustees V.
Anderson (1879) 30 N. J. Eq. 366; Young v. Trustees (1879) 31 N. J. Eq. 290;
and Jillard.v. Worsham (1882) 76 Va. 392.), each holding that a mortgagor
can release a party who has assumed the mortgage debt only if he is solvent.
Most of the cases, however, do not regard the beneficiary's right as that of
a creditor "attaching" upon equitable principles his debtor's debt. The right is
regarded, for the most part as a substantive right growing out of the contract, just as
much as if the beneficiary were a party thereto. Moreover, it is believed that there are
serious obstacles and practical objections in the way of the application of Professor
Williston's theory; see supra note 26, and text in connection therewith.
55. Levet v. Hawes (1599) Cro. Eliz. 619; Williston, Contracts sec. 390. Pro-
fessor Corbin (op. cit. p. 351) says: "The promisee has paid the consideration and
the law should vindicate his right that performance shall take place, even though the
damage to the plaintiff is nominal." Sed qu? If he has any right (i. e. power to sue)
it should be vindicated. But did the parties to the bargain intend to vest any right
in this regard in the promisee? Performance was not for him, but the beneficiary.
The party whose right is to be vindicated is the beneficiary. It is the latter's con-
cern whether or not the promisor shall perform; he may enforce or forgive as he sees
fit.
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in this type of case is that the beneficiary alone may sue; he is the sole
party interested in the performance of the bargain, and he alone should
therefore be afforded redress.
In cases, however, where the beneficiary is a creditor and the
defendant has assumed an obligation running to him from the promisee,
the agreement is for the benefit of the latter as well as the beneficiary,
and the beneficiary can not be regarded as the party solely interested in
performance by the defendant. With very few exceptions, 8 the courts
have recognized this fact, and have to a more or less degree afforded the
promisee a right to sue, holding that either the promisee or beneficiary
may sue, but both may not.57 Under this line of decisions, apparently a
race of diligence is staged; if the benefiiciary sues first, the promisee may
not thereafter, and vice versa. Obviously such a rule is purely mechanical,
and appears to be a means adopted by some courts to circumvent the
improper results that will be reached by carrying the doctrine, which
affords a credit-beneficiary privileges under the contract, to its logical
conclusion. If the promisor really did agree to subject himself to a suit by
the beneficiary, why not the latter sue in spite of the fact that the
promisee has already brought an action on the same contract? It is sur-
mised that two suits are not allowed because the courts are conscious
of the fact that only one liability was agreed to.5"
It should also be noted in this connection that wherever the rule is
that either the promisee or the beneficiary may sue the promisor-
defendant, but not both, if the promisee sues first he thereby destroys
the beneficiary's right to do likewise. Yet the proposition is that a
beneficiary's right, once vested (and it may vest before suit is brought) is
indestructible.59 This inconsistency, however, is inevitable and is due to
the incorrect decision in the first instance, which affords the beneficiary
any powers where actually none were intended to be given to him.
If the theory of a beneficiary's right is that it results from his
acceptance of an offer to novate,60 there is usually no possibility of a
56. See Burbank v. Gould (1838) 15 Me. 118 and Dye v. Mann (1862) 10 Mich.
291, holding that a creditor-beneficiary may not recover from the promisor.
57. Rogers v. Gosnell (1873) 51 Mo. 466 (dictum); Snider v. Adams etc. Co.
(1883) 77 Mo. 523 (dictum); Anthony v. German etc. Co. (1891) 48 Mo. App.
65 (dictum); Williston, Contracts sec. 392 and cases cited.
58. See National Bank v. Grand Lodge, supra note 48.
59. This result is pointed out by Professor Costigan. Costigan, Cases on
Contracts, 643 n.
60. See Wood v. Moriarty, supra note 50.
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double liability being imposed upon the promisor.61 Under such an
interpretation of the contract, if the beneficiary sues the defendant, the
promisee is released from his obligation, and thus not damaged. On the
other hand, if the beneficiary sues the debtor, he rejects the offer to
novate, and the defendant will be liable only to his promisee. Such a
construction of the transaction, while it may be forced and artificial,
has this desirable result, and is for this reason perhaps to be commended.
It will sometimes happen that a creditor-beneficiary will desire to
sue both the promisor and the promisee-debtor. Absent any theory of
novation, 2 there appears to be no objection to his so doing. His right, if
he is conceded any against the promisor, should be regarded as one in
addition to his original power to sue the debtor, and not as a privilege
in the alternative."
V
What are the limits placed around the doctrine allowing a party
benefited by the performance of a contract to sue for a breach? A
plaintiff should show more than the fact that performance will be to his
advantage to entitle him to an action, and courts for the most part have
so held. But the actual decisions, while conceding this proposition, have
established for the solution of this difficult problem no logical test,
which has been consistently adhered to and followed. For example,
as already indicated, at one time in Missouri, as well as in some other
jurisdictions," it was held that a beneficiary could not sue unless he was
a creditor-beneficiary, and the defendant had assumed his promisee's
debt. Such a decision obviously imposed an artificial limitation upon
the rule, and denied many a beneficiary a right, when he was actually
61. But suppose that the contract contemplates an additional benefit to the
promisee besides the discharge of his indebtedness to the beneficiary; in such a case
the promisee could show damage to himself even though the beneficiary has accepted
the offer to novate and by so doing discharged the promisee from his original in-
debtedness. See supra text following note 25.
62. If the contract amounts to an offer to novate, a suit against the promisee-
debtor is a rejection of the promisor's offer; on the other hand, an action against the
promisor discharges the promisee from his original obligation. See supra note 60.
63. In Leckie v. Bennett (1911) 160 Mo. App. 145, 141 S. W. 706, there is
dictum that a beneficiary's right against the promisor is cumulative; that he may sue
both the debtor and the promisor. The case repudiates the proposition that a con-
tract to assume a debt is an offer to novate. But there is authority that a beneficiary
has merely an election as to which party he will hold, and that he cannot hold both.
See Williston, Contracts sec. 393. It seems needless to add that, where a beneficiary
is allowed an action against both the debtor and the promisor, he may obtain but on
satisfaction of the debt.
64. See supra note 38 and text in connection therewith.
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intended to have such. 5 The courts have usually recognized this fact
and such a relationship between the parties is not now usually insisted
upon as a condition to the beneficiary's right to sue."
The cases as a rule require at least the contract to call for the
rendering of performance to the beneficiary. Something must be done
for or delivered to the latter. 7 But even this rule has not been con-
sistently applied, and courts have refused a beneficiary relief in a
considerable number of cases where it was agreed to render performance
to the latter.6 ' As a matter of fact, it seems impossible to say, from a
study of the cases, upon what general principles a beneficiary's rights
are to be tested. If we are fortunate enough to have a case on "all fours"
with one previously decided (as in the creditor-beneficiary cases),
our path may be safe, but if no such transaction is presented, theoutcome
is uncertain. The courts sometimes say that it all depends upon the
intention of the parties to the agreement," but enough has been hereto-
fore noted to show that this view has not always been followed. Too
often have plaintiffs been allowed to sue as beneficiaries where nothing
points to such an intention on the part of the contracting parties. 0
As a matter of principle, the suggestion is ventured that no bene-
ciary should be afforded a right to sue on the contract (unless such a
privilege is expressly stipulated for) if its breach will cause real (as
65. See supra note 38.
66. See supra note 38; as there noted, in many a case the courts have struggled
to find a "moral" duty upon which to predicate a beneficiary's right.
67. Professor Corbin (op. cit. p. 344) says that "incidental" and "unintended"
beneficiaries "are persons not intended by the contracting parties to have new
rights, and not named as beneficiaries or even as the persons to whom payment is to
be made or other performance given." Perhaps the leading case on this point is
Durnherr o. Rau (1892) 135 N. Y. 219, 32 N. E. 49. There, defendant promised
plaintiff's husband to discharge a mortgage upon land in which plaintiff had a right
of dower. Plaintiff was not bound to pay the morgtgage. It was held that plaintiff
was an "incidental beneficiary." Professor Costigan considers the decision wrong
(Costigan Cases on Contracts 624 n.) The learned author contends that the wife was
entitled to exoneration by the payment of the debt and that for this reason the
defendant's promise was exacted for plaintiff's benefit. See also: Cragin v. Lovell
(1883) 109 U. S. 194, 27 L. Ed. 903; New Orleans etc. Iss'n v. Magnier (1861) 16
La. Ann. 338. See also Lewis v. Brookdale etc. Co. (1894) 124 Mo. 672, 28 S. W. 324.
68. See for example: Markel v. Western Union, St. Louis etc. Co. v. Mo. Pac.
Co., supra note 35, and the so-called water company cases discussed supra, note 38.
69. Beattie v. Gerardi (1907) 208 Mo. 89, 106 S. W. 29 (same case 166 Mo. 142,
65 S. W. 1035); O'Connell o. Mercantile Trust Co. (1912) 165 Mo. App. 398, 147 S. W.
841; Uhrich v. Globe etc. Co. (1915) 191 Mo. App. 111, 166 S. W. 845.
70. The creditor-beneficiary's right to sue is the best example of such a right.
See also V7an Meter v. Poole, supra note 23, 119 Mo. App. 296, 95 S. W. 96, a case
certainly of questionable authority.
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distinguished from nominal) damage to the promisee. If such is the
result of the defendant's violation of the bargain, it is only reasonable to
believe that the contract was made for the promisee's own benefit. That
is the function which such a contract is designed to perform. There is
no reason when performance of a contract can accomplish this purpose
for assuming that it is entered into to accomplish some other and differ-
ent purpose, just because the defendant's promised act is going to
benefit another more or less directly. On the other hand, if the defen-
dant's failure to carry out his promise will not cause his promisee any
substantial injury, the beneficiary should be allowed to recover for the
breach, if performance is to be rendered to him, unless perhaps the promisee
made the contract under mistake, believing that he was under an obli-
gation to render the agreed performance to the beneficiary.7' In the
last assumed case, the only purpose of the agreement, (absent a mistake
on the promisee's part as to his duty to the beneficiary) must have been
to procure a benefit for the beneficiary. If nothing was to come to the
promisee under the agreement, and a real agreement was contemplated,
who else could have been intended, other than the beneficiary, as the




71. See State ex rel. v. Loemis (1901) 88 Mo. App. 500. But see LaCrosse Co.
v. Schwartz (1912) 163 Mo. App. 659, 147 S. W. 501. Perhaps the decision in Vrooman
v. Turner, supra note 38, and kindred cases may be supported on this basis. Is not
the grantor who has taken subject to a mortgage and grants away, exacting an
obligation that the debt be paid by his grantee, to be taken as laboring under the
delusion that he was bound to pay the debt? If this be the case then the contract
should not be binding; the parties contracted under a mutual mistake.
72. The writer obviously would be ungrateful were he not to acknowledge the
great assistance that he has received from Professor Williston's treatise on Contracts
and Professor Costigan's Cases. Each work is outstanding in its particular field.
